Some voting systems are reliant on external authentication services. Others use cryptography to implement their own. We combine digital signatures and non-interactive proofs to derive a generic construction for voting systems with their own authentication mechanisms, from systems that rely on external authentication services. We prove that our construction produces systems satisfying ballot secrecy and election verifiability, assuming the underlying voting system does. Moreover, we observe that works based on similar ideas provide neither ballot secrecy nor election verifiability. Finally, we demonstrate applicability of our results by applying our construction to the Helios voting system.
@inproceedings{2018-voting-authentication,
author = "Elizabeth A. Quaglia and Ben Smyth",
title = "Authentication with weaker trust assumptions for voting systems",
year = "2018",
booktitle = "AFRICACRYPT'18: 10th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa",
publisher = "Springer",
series = "LNCS",
volume = "10831",
pages = "322--343",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-89339-6_18",
}