We present an extension of the applied pi-calculus that can be used to model distance bounding protocols. A range of different security properties have been suggested for distance bounding protocols; we show how these can be encoded in our model and prove a partial order between them. We also relate the different security properties to particular attacker models. In doing so, we identify a new property, which we call uncompromised distance bounding, that captures the attacker model for protecting devices such as contactless payment cards or car entry systems, which assumes that the prover being tested has not been compromised, though other provers may have been. We show how to compile our new calculus into the applied pi-calculus so that protocols can be automatically checked with the ProVerif tool and we use this to analyse distance bounding protocols from MasterCard and NXP.
@inproceedings{2018-distance-bounding-protocols,
author = "Tom Chothia and Joeri de Ruiter and Ben Smyth",
title = "Modelling and Analysis of a Hierarchy of Distance Bounding Attacks",
year = "2018",
booktitle = "USENIX Security'18: 27th USENIX Security Symposium",
publisher = "USENIX Association",
}